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MONOPOLY DESK · SERIOUS

Court kills Trump's emergency coal order: How to stop the next one

A federal appeals court blocked the Department of Energy's illegal order forcing Michigan's J.H. Campbell coal plant open past its May 2025 retirement date, ruling there was no emergency under law. The precedent closes one backdoor to rate-base preservation, but six other coal and gas plants remain under similar orders.

Electrek reported that a federal appeals court has struck down the Trump administration's order keeping a Michigan coal plant open[1]. The J.H. Campbell Generating Plant was scheduled to retire in May 2025 after Consumers Energy and Michigan regulators had approved the closure[2]. Days before shutdown, Energy Secretary Chris Wright issued an emergency order claiming the plant was needed to prevent blackouts during summer peak demand[4]. The D.C. Circuit unanimously rejected that claim, holding that the Federal Power Act's emergency provision is "essentially a narrow, last-resort backstop" and that no real emergency existed to override a state-approved retirement plan[2].

This is a rare win for ratepayers, but the mechanism it exposes runs deeper than one coal plant. The order forced Consumers Energy customers to fund roughly $78 million per year in uneconomic operating costs for 468 days after the plant's planned retirement[1]. That is not a transmission emergency; it is a rate-base emergency. A 64-year-old coal unit generating electricity the market will not buy at a price that covers its fuel cost is a liability, not an asset. The moment the company stops running it, that undepreciated balance comes off the books and the return on that equity vanishes. An emergency order buys time for the utility to file a securitization request, a rate increase, or a "reliability must-run" cost-of-service claim from the grid operator, converting a stranded asset into a stranded bill.

The court's ruling cuts that path: there is no federal police power to bypass state and RTO approval and keep a plant alive for shareholder equity. But the Trump administration has issued similar orders on six coal plants and one gas unit in six states[1], and none of them have been litigated yet. The precedent travels, but only if challenged. Indiana, Washington state, and Colorado coal plants under similar orders[8] now have grounds to file suit. Consumers Energy itself opposed this order in its filings[1], a sign that even the utility's own engineers knew the plant was not needed and the cost was irrational.

The next layer of the same game is already rolling. Utilities are filing Integrated Resource Plan dockets and CPCN applications for gigawatts of new gas plants justified by data-center load forecasts that have tripled in two years but remain uncontracted and speculative. RMI modeling suggests that most of those plants will be uneconomic to run by the mid-2030s, meaning the approval dockets being filed right now are where tomorrow's stranded costs are being baked in. The Campbell decision does not stop that; it only closes one emergency exit. The honest path is securitized retirement: refinance the undepreciated balance at bond rates, retire the plant, and flow the savings to ratepayers, with a slice funding worker and community transition. That is how Colorado and New Mexico handle coal exits. A utility that resists securitization and instead files for a rate increase or a must-run designation is signaling that it prefers to shift the uneconomic delta to customer bills rather than absorb it in a corporate bond offering.

For ratepayers: check your state's RTO filings for any "reliability must-run" units that outlived their planned retirement. Request the cost-of-service rate claim and compare it against the independent market monitor's dispatch analysis. If a unit is not moving the needle on congestion or voltage and is running in the red, the RMR is rate-base preservation in a hard hat. For state energy advocates: the states that beat the Campbell order (Michigan, Illinois, Minnesota) now have a model for litigation; use it on the other six plants. Demand that utilities file securitization plans instead of rate increases. For grid operators: reject inflated cost-of-service claims for uneconomic units and require that any RMR designation include a dated transmission-upgrade path and true-up review.

The alternative
Securitized retirement: the utility refinances the remaining undepreciated book balance of the coal or gas plant at corporate bond rates (roughly 3 to 5 percent, versus the current 7 to 10 percent return on rate base), retires the plant, and flows the carrying-cost savings to ratepayers over the bond's term. Colorado and New Mexico's Energy Transition Act models this with binding retirement dates, independent savings verification, and workforce transition funding. A utility that refuses securitization and files instead for a rate increase or must-run cost-of-service claim is choosing to hide the uneconomic delta in customer bills. Call it what it is, and demand the securitization docket instead.
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Levers · emergency-order-litigation · securitized-retirement-statute · fuel-clause-disallowance · RTO-cost-of-service-review · RMR-transparency-requirement
O
Owen Frazier · Fossil Bailout Tracker, Monopoly Desk

Owen tracks the coal and gas plants that survive on ratepayer life support — the ones cheaper to close than to keep running, kept alive because their owners still earn a return on them. The market retired the plant, he likes to say; the monopoly billed ratepayers to keep the corpse warm. He computes the cost of running an uneconomic plant, catches the accounting tricks that hide it, and separates an honest, financed retirement from a bailout wearing better paper. New gas built against falling demand, he warns, is tomorrow's stranded bill.

Edited by Victor; fact-checked by Ezra ; signed off by Margaret. Full profile →

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