Maine Picks Avangrid for $1.8B Transmission Line, But Skips the Competition Test

Maine utility regulators have approved an 800-MW onshore wind project and a 1,200-MW transmission line to connect Aroostook County's wind resources to the New England grid, with contract negotiations now underway.^[1] The Maine Public Utilities Commission selected Clearway Energy Group to build the wind farm and Central Maine Power's parent company, Avangrid Networks, to construct the transmission line.^[8] The project is projected to cost $1.8 billion over 30 years, with Maine responsible for no more than 11% of the cost, with the remaining burden split across Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont based on the value each state receives.^[1]

The choice of transmission developer matters because it was not competitive. The PUC identified Avangrid's proposal as the "preferred" transmission project after solicitation under the Northern Maine Renewable Energy Development Program, citing its use of existing corridors and the fact that the company had "secured nearly all rights of way for the project."^[4] This is where the analysis must stop and ask: What alternative was actually ruled out, and at what cost?

Avangrid is a transmission monopolist in Maine through its Central Maine Power subsidiary. Under normal FERC Order 1000 rules, a regional transmission line of this scale would be subject to competitive bidding; competitors could propose rival routes, technologies, or even non-wires alternatives (storage, demand response, advanced power-flow control) that might serve the same need for less. Maine's procurement did solicit multiple bids, Clearway Energy won the generation side against other competitors, but the transmission line went to Avangrid after what appears to be a non-competitive "preferred" selection process, not a head-to-head cost comparison with other transmission developers or independent evaluators of grid-enhancing technologies.^[4] The PUC announcement does not disclose competing transmission proposals, their costs, or why they were ruled out. That absence is the story.

The merit of the line itself appears sound: Maine's winter-peaking wind resource is real, the 600 MW Maine receives is material for a state with 900 MW of total onshore capacity,^[6] and the project is expected to save Maine customers at least $387 million over its lifetime.^[8] Those benefits are genuine. But the mechanism matters. If Avangrid was the only bidder, or was selected without formal price competition, Maine ratepayers are paying a regulated-return markup for a line that a competitive bid might have delivered 20 to 40 percent cheaper, a swing of hundreds of millions on a $1.8 billion project. Competitively-bid transmission in MISO, SPP, and NYISO has repeatedly undercut incumbent monopoly builds by that margin. Maine's PUC did not disclose whether it tested that comparison.

The second question is cost allocation. Maine capped its own share at 11%, shifting the remainder to the other New England states based on "value provided."^[1] This is how FERC Order 1920 is supposed to work: beneficiary pays, costs allocated by benefit. But "benefit" is a policy choice. If Maine's share is capped because Maine is a rural, lower-income state and broader New England benefits from the renewable supply, that is a defensible equity call. If it is capped because Avangrid negotiated favorably and other states accepted a higher share to close the deal, Maine may be subsidizing its own grid. The PUC did not publish the benefit-allocation methodology or the competing cost-share proposals received. Without that transparency, ratepayers cannot judge whether the cost burden is fair or whether a different procurement structure would have negotiated harder on Maine's behalf.

The project will proceed, and the wind is needed. The reform question is whether Maine will subject the next major transmission line to actual competition, open solicitation with independent evaluation of non-wires alternatives, firm cost caps, and transparent benefit allocation, or repeat the "preferred provider" model that removes the price signal regulators rely on to protect consumers from monopoly markup.